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NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3771 
___________ 
 
VITO A. PELINO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-01308) 
District Judge: Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 27, 2020 
Before:  KRAUSE, MATEY and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed January 28, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Vito Pelino appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his 
complaint after screening it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  For the reasons that 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment with one modification. 
In September 2018, Pelino filed a request for injunctive relief in the District Court, 
seeking to enjoin the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and the Warden of SCI-
Greene in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, from following a prison mail policy that had been 
implemented earlier that month.  Soon after, Pelino sought to proceed in forma pauperis 
(“IFP”) and submitted a complaint for filing in the District Court that was dated October 
13, 2018, and was date-stamped as having been mailed on October 16, 2018; Pelino also 
reiterated his request for injunctive relief.  The District Court granted Pelino leave to 
proceed IFP on October 24, 2018. 
Adopting a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the District Court 
ultimately dismissed Pelino’s complaint with prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The 
District Court concluded that Pelino had not exhausted his administrative remedies by the 
time he had submitted his complaint for filing.  Pelino indicated in his complaint that he 
had “been filing grievances . . . and appeals since th[e] new policy came into effect” but 
that he was still “awaiting [a] response” from his “initial grievance” at that time.  See 
Compl. at ECF p. 3.  After the District Court dismissed his complaint, Pelino filed a motion 
for reconsideration that included objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, arguing that 
he had received a “final denial of his grievance appeal” that was dated October 22, 2018.  
See Objections at p. 1.  Pelino thus alleged that he had completed the exhaustion of his 
administrative remedies before the District Court granted his request to proceed IFP.  The 
District Court denied Pelino’s motion.  Pelino timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We construe 
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Pelino’s allegations liberally and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
dismissal of Pelino’s complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
We agree with the District Court that Pelino’s complaint was subject to dismissal 
because Pelino had not exhausted his administrative remedies at the time that he brought 
his case.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  This Court has recently concluded that “a prisoner has 
‘brought an action’” for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) “when he 
tenders or submits his complaint to [a district] court,” rather than when a complaint is 
docketed after a district court grants IFP status to a prisoner.  See Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 
655, 661 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc).  Although our analysis in Brown focused on interpreting 
when an action is “brought” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), we noted that “our 
conclusion accords with how the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
have interpreted ‘brought’” in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  See id. at 662-63.  
Those Courts have held that a prisoner must exhaust his available administrative remedies 
before tendering a complaint to a district court — the point at which an action is “brought.”  
See Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 
395, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, Pelino “brought” this action in the District 
Court when he submitted his complaint to prison authorities for mailing, not when the 
District Court granted him leave to proceed IFP. 
Next, it was apparent from the allegations Pelino made in his complaint and his 
supporting filings that he brought this action before his administrative remedies had been 
exhausted.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (providing that a prisoner must exhaust all 
“available” administrative remedies prior to bringing suit); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 
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532 (2002) (holding “that the PLA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits 
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and 
whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”).  Accordingly, the District 
Court properly dismissed his complaint and his accompanying requests for relief.1  See 
Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that “substantial 
compliance” with the administrative exhaustion requirement of the PLRA “does not 
encompass . . . the filing of a suit before administrative exhaustion . . . has been 
completed”).  Both the date on Pelino’s complaint and the date that the complaint was 
mailed to the District Court fell before October 22, 2018, when Pelino alleged that he had 
completed exhausting his administrative remedies. 
Pelino argues on appeal that he was not required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies prior to initiating suit because exhaustion is not one of the four factors for 
receiving injunctive relief, and because his constitutional rights were violated by the 
prison’s new mail policy.  Pelino’s conclusory insistence that his constitutional rights were 
violated does not excuse the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement here, and exhaustion is a 
preliminary requirement before addressing the merits of a litigant’s claim for relief. 
For the reasons above, Pelino has shown no error in the District Court’s dismissal 
                                              
1  Sua sponte action by the District Court was appropriate under the circumstances of this 
case.  See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that a district 
court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
when a plaintiff “explicitly concede[s]” that exhaustion has not been completed on the face 
of the complaint).  The District Court appropriately did not address Pelino’s request for 
injunctive relief before it dismissed his complaint because it was clear that Pelino had filed 
his complaint prematurely.  See Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. 
 5 
 
of his complaint.2  However, because Pelino could pursue his claims in a new action after 
exhausting his administrative remedies, the dismissal should have been without prejudice.  
See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 78 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and noting that courts 
should not reach merits of unexhausted claims).  Accordingly, we modify the District 
Court’s order to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s order as modified. 
 
                                              
2  Further, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pelino’s motion for 
reconsideration; Pelino’s arguments lacked merit, for the reasons provided by the District 
Court.  See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Budget 
Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  Pelino’s motion was properly 
treated as a request for reconsideration regarding the adjudication of his initial complaint.  
Cf. Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he scope of a 
motion for reconsideration . . . is extremely limited” and may not “be used as an opportunity 
to relitigate the case.”). 
